Machine learning models trained on confidential datasets are increasingly being deployed for profit. Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) has made such models easily accessible to end-users. Prior work has developed model extraction attacks, in which an adversary extracts an approximation of MLaaS models by making black-box queries to it. However, none of these works is able to satisfy all the three essential criteria for practical model extraction: (i) the ability to work on deep learning models, (ii) the non-requirement of domain knowledge and (iii) the ability to work with a limited query budget. We design a model extraction framework that makes use of active learning and large public datasets to satisfy them. We demonstrate that it is possible to use this framework to steal deep classifiers trained on a variety of datasets from image and text domains. By querying a model via black-box access for its top prediction, our framework improves performance on an average over a uniform noise baseline by 4.70× for image tasks and 2.11× for text tasks respectively, while using only 30% (30,000 samples) of the public dataset at its disposal.
Model privacy is also important to developers of other ML products (such as self-driving vehicles and translation tools). Datasets are expensive to gather and curate, and models require expertise to design and implement -thus, it is in the best interest of corporations to protect their ML models to maintain a competitive edge.
Tramèr et al. [11] define the concept of model extraction (see Figure 1) . In model extraction, the adversary is an agent that can query a secret model (e.g., a MLaaS provider via APIs) to obtain predictions on any supplied input vector of its choosing. The returned predictions may either be label probability distributions, or just the Top-1 prediction -we assume the latter. Using the obtained predictions, the adversary trains a substitute model to approximate the secret model function. The adversary may not know the secret model architecture or associated hyperparameters. The adversary has access to a thief dataset of the same media type (i.e. images or text) from which it draws samples to query the secret model. The data in this thief dataset may be drawn from a different distribution than the secret dataset on which the secret model was originally trained. Prior work has used the following thief datasets:
• Uniform noise: Tramèr et al. [11] perform model extraction by querying the secret model with inputs sampled i.i.d. uniformly at random. They demonstrate their method on logistic regression models, SVMs, shallow (1 hidden layer) feedforward neural networks and decision trees. According to our experiments, this approach does not scale well to deeper neural networks (such as our architecture for image classification with 12 convolutional layers; see Section 6.1 for further details).
• Hand-crafted examples: Papernot et al. [7] design a model extraction framework that can be used to extract DNNs. However, this technique assumes domain knowledge on the part of the attacker. The adversary should either have access to a subset of the secret dataset, or create data (such as by drawing digits using a pen tablet) that closely resembles it.
• Unlabeled non-problem domain data: Correia-Silva et al. [12] demonstrate that convolutional neural networks (CNNs) can be copied by querying them with a mix of non-problem domain and problem domain data. For example, they demonstrate that a DNN trained using European crosswalk images [13] as the secret dataset can be copied using a mix of ImageNet (non-problem domain data) and crosswalk images from America and Asia (problem domain data) as the thief dataset. They do not consider a query budget in their work.
In this work, we investigate the feasibility of implementing a practical approach to model extraction, viz. one that deals with the following criteria:
• Ability to extract DNNs: Most state of the art ML solutions use DNNs. Thus, it is critical for a model extraction technique to be effective for this class of models.
• No domain knowledge: The adversary should be expected to have little to no domain knowledge related to task implemented by the secret model. In particular, they should not be expected to have access to samples from the secret dataset.
• Ability to work within a query budget: Queries made to MLaaS services are billed pro rata, and such services are often rate limited. Thus, it is in an attacker's best interest to minimize the number of queries they make to the secret model.
We compare our approach to the three approaches described above on these three criteria [11, 7, 12] in Table 1 . As can be seen, we can extract DNNs with no domain knowledge, while working with a limited query budget. To achieve these criteria, our paper introduces two novel techniques: Tramèr et al. [11] Papernot et al. [7] Copycat CNN [12] Our framework
• Universal thief datasets: These are large and diverse public domain datasets, analogous to the non-problem domain (NPD) data of Correia-Silva et al. [12] . For instance, we show that ImageNet constitutes a universal thief for vision tasks, whereas a dataset of Wikipedia articles constitutes a universal thief for NLP tasks. Our key insight is that universal thief datasets provide a more natural prior than uniform noise, while not requiring domain knowledge to obtain.
• Active learning strategies: Active learning is a technique used in scenarios where labeling is expensive. It strives to select a small yet informative set of training samples to maximize accuracy while minimizing the total labeling cost. In this paper, we use pool-based active learning, where the algorithm has access to a large set of unlabeled examples (i.e. the thief dataset) from which it picks the next sample(s) to be labeled. Although universal thief datasets constitute an excellent prior for model extraction, their size makes them unsuitable for use when the query budget is limited. We make use of active learning to construct an optimal query set, thus reducing the number of queries made to the MLaaS model. This ensures that the attacker stays within the query budget.
Our contributions include:
1. We define the notion of universal thief datasets for different media types such as images and text.
2. We propose a framework for model extraction that makes use of universal thief datasets in conjunction with active learning strategies. We demonstrate our framework on DNNs for image and text classification tasks.
3. Finally, we introduce the notion of ensemble active learning strategies as a combination of existing active learning strategies. We design and leverage one such ensemble strategy to improve performance.
Overall, we demonstrate that by leveraging public data and active learning, we improve agreement between the secret model and the substitute model by, on an average, 4.70× (across image classification tasks) and 2.11× (across text classification tasks) over the uniform noise baseline of Tramèr et al. [11] , when working with a total query budget of 30K.
We plan to release the source code for our framework under an open source license soon.
Background
In this section, we introduce the active learning set of techniques from the machine learning literature. We also briefly discuss adversarial example generation, which is later used as the crux of the DeepFool Active Learning (DFAL) strategy [14] used by our framework.
Preliminaries
In machine learning, a dataset D consists of labeled examples (x, y), where x ∈ X is an example and y ∈ Y is its associated label, where X is said to be the instance space and Y is the label space. It is assumed that there is an underlying unknown mapping φ : X → Y from which D is generated (i.e. (x, y) ∈ D implies that y = φ(x)). In this paper, we restrict ourselves to the classification setting, where Y = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e J } 3 .
3 ej represents the j th standard basis vector, i.e. 0, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0, 0 ∈ R J , a vector with a a 1 in the j th position, and 0 elsewhere. Such a vector is said to be one-hot. A pair (x, y) where y is a vector with 1 in the j th position indicates that the sample x belongs to the j th class (out of J classes).
In passive machine learning, the learner has access to a large training dataset D train of labeled examples and must learn a hypothesis function f that minimizes a loss function. A typical loss function is mean squared error (MSE):
The better the hypothesis (i.e. when predictions f (x) match labels y), the lower the value of the loss function L. Other loss functions such as cross-entropy (CE) are also used. Machine learning models such as DNNs learn a function by minimizing this loss function on the training dataset. DNNs, when trained on a large corpus of training examples, have been shown to exhibit good generalization ability across a diversity of tasks in various domains [15] , i.e. provided a previously unseen test example x test , the prediction that they make, f (x test ) approximates the value of φ(x test ) well, i.e.
However, to achieve good generalization performance, such DNNs require a very large training dataset. The labeling effort required is massive, and learning may be intractable in scenarios where there is a high cost associated with each label, such as paying crowd workers. In the context of model extraction, this may involve querying a MLaaS model, which are billed pro rata by the MLaaS service provider.
Active learning
Active learning [16] is useful in scenarios where there is a high cost associated with labeling instances. In active learning, the learner does not use the full labeled dataset D. Rather, the learner starts with either an unlabeled dataset X of samples x; or, alternatively, the learner can itself generate samples x de novo. Following this, an oracle f O is used to label the sample, which assigns it the true label y = f O (x). Active learning can be broadly classified into one of the following scenarios:
• Stream-based selective sampling: In this scenario, the learner is presented with a stream of unlabeled samples x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , drawn from the underlying distribution. The learner must decide to either accept or reject an individual sample x n for querying. This can be done by checking, e.g., the "uncertainty" of the prediction (we will formally define this in Section 4.1) made by the classifier on a specific sample x n . For samples that are accepted by the learner, the oracle is queried to label them. Once rejected, a sample cannot be queried in the future.
• Pool-based sampling: In this scenario, the learner has access to a full unlabeled dataset X of samples {x 1 , x 2 , . . . x |X| }. Unlike in stream-based selective sampling, the learner does not have to consider each sample x n in isolation. The learner's objective is thus to select a subset S ⊆ X of samples to be queried. While it is possible to do this in one shot, pool-based sampling may also be done incrementally, either choosing one sample at a time, or an entire batch of samples in each iteration. Correspondingly, the oracle may be queried on one sample at a time, or the entire batch of selected samples.
• Query synthesis: Here, the learner generates samples x de novo without first approximating the underlying distribution. This process could be entirely uninformed -for instance, the learner could generate data points by sampling uniformly at random from a multivariate uniform or Gaussian distribution -or, it could be more informed: such as by using a generative model. The oracle is then queried with the generated sample.
In this work, we make use of pool-based sampling. In particular, we consider the scenario where the learner adds a batch of samples in each iteration of the algorithm. We grow the subset S 0 S 1 S 2 · · · S N over N iterations, such that each subset S i is a selection of samples from the full dataset S i ⊆ X.
Adversarial example generation and the DeepFool technique
We introduce the notion of adversarial example generation, in particular the DeepFool [6] technique. This technique will be used while introducing the DeepFool Active Learning (DFAL) [14] active learning strategy in Section 4.1.
It is known that DNNs can be easily fooled as demonstrated by, the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) of Goodfellow et al. [1] , the C&W attack of Carlini and Wagner [3] , the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) of Papernot et al. [5] and many others [2, 4, 6, 7, 8] . In particular, neural networks trained to perform image classification tasks have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. An adversary can add a small amount of noise to input images, which, while being imperceptible to the human eye, can change the classification decision made by the neural network, as shown in Figure 2 .
These techniques typically work as follows -given an innocuous image x, they compute a small, typically imperceptible additive noise δ. This noise is then added to the original image to produce an adversarial image,x = x + δ. The objective is that, given a machine learning model f , the prediction of the perturbed image no longer matches the prediction made for the original image, viz. f (x) = f (x).
DeepFool [6] is one such technique for the generation of adversarial examples. It solves the following problem iteratively:
In the binary classification setting (i.e. where range f = {−1, 1}), it uses a first order approximation of the analytical solution for the linearly-separable case:
∇f (x l )
The process is started by setting x 0 = x, and terminates at the lowest index L for which f (x L ) = f (x). The total perturbation is obtained by taking the sum of the individual perturbations at each step, δ = L l=1 δ l . This algorithm can be extended to work in the multiclass classification setting. We refer interested readers to [8] for further details.
Threat model
Before we describe the proposed algorithm, we first state the threat model under which it operates.
Attack surface. We assume that the adversary cannot directly access the secret model, but can only query it in a black-box fashion via an API. We assume that there is a query cost associated with each API query made by the adversary. While there is no limit on the number of queries that can be made theoretically, the ability of the adversary to make queries is restricted in practice by the total query budget. This query cost model can be used to model rate-limiting defenses. For example, each query can have an associated cost, and a defense would be to limit queries from a source that has exceeded its cost threshold.
Capabilities. The adversary has black-box access to the secret model via an API, by which it can query it with any image or text of its choosing. It thus has full knowledge of both the input specification (i.e. the type of media -images or text) and the output specification (the set of possible labels). Note that the adversary does not have direct access to the exact gradient information of the model, but only the final prediction. We consider two scenarios -one where a Top-1 prediction is returned (as a one-hot standard basis vector), and another where the model returns a softmax 4 probability distribution over the target output classes. Our primary experiments assume the weaker capability of receiving only the Top-1 predictions, and not the softmax probability distributions.
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Next query set Si+1 Adversary's goal. The goal of the adversary is to obtain a substitute model function that closely resembles (i.e. approximates) the secret model function:f ≈ f
To do so, it trains a substitute modelf on a subset of the thief dataset, S ⊆ X thief ,
where L is the chosen loss function. As there is a cost associated with querying f and |X thief |, the adversary would want |S| |X thief |. The resulting modelf is treated as the extracted model at the end of the process. As it is not possible to arrive at analytical optimum in the general case, the quality of the extracted model is judged using the following Agreement metric.
Definition (Agreement):
Two models f andf agree on the label for a sample x if they predict the same label for the same sample, i.e. f (x) =f (x). The agreement of two networks f andf is the fraction of samples x from a dataset D on which they agree, i.e. for which f (x) =f (x)
where 1(·) is the indicator function. Note that the agreement score does not depend on the true label y. Agreement is penalized for every sample for which the predicted labels by the two models f (x) andf (x) do not match. The higher the agreement between two models on a held-out test set, the more likely it is that the extracted model approximates the secret model well.
Technical details
We start with a high-level description of the framework with reference to Figure 3 .
1. The adversary first picks a random subset S 0 of the unlabeled thief dataset X thief to kickstart the process.
2. In the i th iteration (i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N ), the adversary queries the samples in S i against the secret model f and obtains the correctly labeled subset
3. Using D i , it trains the substitute modelf .
4. The trained substitute model is then queried with all samples in X thief to form the approximately labeled datasetD i+1 .
5.
A subset selection strategy usesD i+1 to select the points S i+1 to be queried next.
The process is repeated for a fixed number of iterations, with the substitute modelf being refined in each iteration. The procedure is formally described in Algorithm 1. The training procedure followed by TRAINNETWORK is described in Section 5.3. The details of SUBSETSELECTION follow. 
Active learning subset selection strategies
In each iteration, the adversary selects a new set of k thief dataset samples S i ⊆ X thief to label by querying the secret model f . This is done using a strategy from the active learning literature:
• Random strategy: A subset of size k consisting of samples x n is selected uniformly at random, corresponding to pairs (x n ,ỹ n ) inD i .
• Uncertainty strategy: This method is based on uncertainty sampling [23] . For every pair (x n ,ỹ n ) ∈D i , the entropy H n of predicted probability vectorsỹ n =f (x n ) is computed:
where j is the label index. The k samples x n corresponding to the highest entropy values H n (i.e. those that the model is least certain about) are selected, breaking ties arbitrarily.
Ducoffe and Precioso [14] demonstrate that the uncertainty strategy does not work well on DNNs. Thus, we also consider two state-of-the-art active learning strategies for DNNs:
• K-center strategy: We use the greedy K-center algorithm of Sener and Savarese [24] to construct a core-set of samples. This strategy operates in the space of probability vectors produced by the substitute model. The predicted probability vectorsỹ m =f (x m ) for samples (x m , y m ) ∈ D i−1 are considered to be cluster centers.
In each iteration, the strategy selects k centers by picking, one at a time, pairs (x n ,ỹ n ) ∈D i such thatỹ n is the most distant from all existing centers:
where:
is moved to the set of selected centers. This process is repeated to obtain k pairs. The samples x * 0 , x * 1 , . . . x * k corresponding to the chosen pairs are selected.
• Adversarial strategy: We use the DeepFool Active Learning (DFAL) algorithm by Ducoffe and Precioso [14] . In this strategy, DeepFool [6] (explained in Section 2.3) is applied to every sample x n ∈D i to obtain a perturbedx n that gets misclassified by the substitute modelf , i.e.f (x n ) =f (x n ). (Note that this does not involve querying the secret model.) Let:
DFAL is a margin-based approach to active learning, i.e. it identifies samples that lie close to the decision boundary. To do this, it prefers samples x n corresponding to lower values of α n , i.e. smallest distance between x n and its adversarially perturbed neighborx n that lies across the decision boundary. Thus, this strategy selects the k samples x n corresponding to the lowest perturbation α n .
Ensemble of subset selection strategies
While the K-center strategy maximizes diversity, it does not ensure that each individual sample is helpful to the learner. On the contrary, while the adversarial strategy ensures that each individual sample is informative, it does nothing to eliminate redundancy across the samples selected. Inspired by this observation, we introduce the following ensemble subset selection strategy called Adversarial+K-center strategy.
In this ensemble strategy, the adversarial strategy is first used to pick ρ points (ρ is a configurable parameter). Of these, k points are selected using the K-center strategy.The adversarial strategy first picks samples that lie close to the decision boundary. Following this, the K-center strategy selects a subset of these points with an aim to maximize diversity. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this strategy experimentally in Section 6.1.
Experimental setup
We now describe the datasets and DNN architecture used in our experiments.
Datasets
The details of each dataset can be found in Table 2 .
Secret datasets. For image classification, we use the MNIST dataset of handwritten digits [25] , the Fashion-MNIST (F-MNIST) dataset of small grayscale images of fashion products across 10 categories [26] , the CIFAR-10 dataset of tiny color images [27] and the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) [28] .
For text classification, we use the MR dataset [29] of 5,331 positive and 5,331 statements from movie reviews, the IMDB [30] dataset of movie reviews, AG News corpus 6 of news from 5 categories and the QC question classification dataset [31] .
Thief dataset. For images, we use a subset of the ILSVRC2012-14 dataset [32] as the thief dataset. In particular, we use a downsampled version of this data prepared by Chrabaszcz et al. [33] . The training and validation splits are reduced to a subset of size 100,000, while the test split is left unchanged.
For text, we use sentences extracted from the WikiText-2 [34] dataset of Wikipedia articles.
DNN architecture
The same base complexity architectures are used for both the secret and the substitute model for our primary evaluation in Sections 6.1 and 6.3. We also conduct additional experiments on image classification tasks where the model complexities are varied between the secret and substitute models in Section 6.2.
We first describe the base complexity architectures for image and text classification:
Image classification. We use a multi-layered CNN, shown in Figure 4 . The input is followed by 3 convolution blocks. Each convolution block consists of 2 repeated units -a single repeated unit consists of 2 convolution (3 × 3 kernel with stride 1) and 1 pooling (2 × 2 kernel with stride 2) layers. Each convolution is followed by a ReLU activation and batch normalization layer. Pooling is followed by a dropout. Convolution layers in each block use 32, 64 and 128 filters respectively. No two layers share parameters. The output of the final pooling layer is flattened and passed through fully connected and softmax layers to obtain the vector of output probabilities.
Text classification. We use the CNN for sentence classification by Kim [35] . In the secret model, word2vec [36] is first used to obtain the word embeddings. The embeddings are then concatenated and 100 1-dimensional filters each of sizes 3, 4 and 5 are applied to convolve over time. This is followed by max-over-time pooling, which produces a 300-dimensional vector. This vector is then passed through fully connected and softmax layers to obtain the vector of output probabilities.
Training Regime
For training, we use the Adam optimizer [37] with default hyperparameters (β 1 = 0.9, β 2 = 0.999, = 10 −8 and a learning rate of 0.001). In each iteration, the network is trained starting from the same random initialization for at most 1,000 epochs with a batch size of 150 (for images) or 50 (for text). Early stopping is used with a patience of 100 epochs (for images) or 20 epochs (for text). An L 2 regularizer is applied to all the model parameters with a loss term multiplier of 0.001, and dropout is applied at a rate of 0.1 for all datasets other than CIFAR-10. For CIFAR-10, a dropout of 0.2 is used. At the end of each epoch, the model is evaluated and the F 1 measure on the validation split is recorded. The model with the best validation F 1 measure is selected asf in that iteration.
Our experiments are run on a server with a 24-core Intel Xeon Gold 6150 CPU and NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080Ti GPUs. We use the algorithm parameters k 0 = 0.1B (where B is the total query budget, as in Algorithm 1) and η = 0.2 across all our experiments. For the ensemble strategy, we set ρ = B, the total query budget.
Experimental results
In our experiments we seek to obtain answers to the following questions: 
How does the query budget affect agreement?
3. What is the impact of using universal thief datasets over using uniform noise samples to query the secret model?
4. What is the impact of the DNN architectures (of the secret and substitute models) on the agreement obtained?
The first three questions are answered in the context of image datasets in Section 6.1 and text datasets in Section 6.3. The fourth question is answered in Section 6.2.
In our experiments, for all but the random strategy, training is done iteratively. As the choice of samples in random strategy is not affected by the substitute modelf obtained in each iteration, we skip iterative training. We also train a substitute model using the full thief dataset for comparison. The metric used for evaluation of the closeness between the secret model f and the substitute modelf is agreement between f andf , evaluated on the test split of the secret dataset.
Image classification
For each image dataset (described in Section 5.1), we run our framework across the following total query budgets: 10K, 15K, 20K, 25K and 30K (K = 1,000). For a budget of 20K, we show the agreement at the end of each iteration for every strategy and each dataset in Figure 5 .
We tabulate the agreement obtained at the end of the final iteration for each experiment in Table 3 . Our observations across these 20 experiments are as follows:
Effectiveness of active learning. The benefits of careful selection of thief dataset samples can be clearly seen: there is no dataset for which the random strategy performs better than all of the other strategies. In particular, K-center underperforms only once, while adversarial and adversarial+K-center underperform twice. Uncertainty underperforms 6 times, but this is in line with the findings of Ducoffe and Precioso [14] .
Effectiveness of the ensemble method. The agreement of the models is improved by the ensemble strategy over the basic adversarial strategy in 14 experiments. Of these, the ensemble strategy emerges as the winner in 13 experimentsa clear majority. This improvement in agreement bears evidence to the increased potential of the combined strategy in extracting information from the secret model. The other competitive method is the K-center method, which wins in 5 experiments. This is followed by the adversarial strategy which won in 2 experiments. Impact of the number of iterations. Table 4 shows that with an increase in the number of iterations, there is an improvement in agreement for the same budget. Thus, the substitute model agreement can be improved by increasing the number of iterations (at the expense of increased training time).
Impact of access to output probability distribution. Table 4 demonstrates that access to the output probabilities of the secret model results in an improvement in agreement. We believe that this is because the substitute model receives a signal corresponding to every output neuron for each thief dataset sample that it is trained on. Consequently, the substitute model learns a better approximation. However, as many MLaaS models return only the Top-K or often Top-1 prediction, we run our experiments on the more restricted setting with access to only the Top-1 prediction.
Impact of the query budget. As is evident from Table 3 , there is almost always a substantial improvement in agreement when increasing the total query budget.
Effectiveness of universal thief datasets. We see that uniform noise (as used in prior work by Tramèr et al. [11] ) achieves a low agreement on all datasets. The reason for failure is as follows: in our experiments, we observe that when the secret model is queried with uniform noise, there are many labels which are predicted extremely rarely, while others dominate, e.g., the digit 6 dominates in MNIST and Frog dominates in CIFAR-10 (see Figure 6 ). In other words, it is difficult for an adversary to discover images belonging to certain classes using uniform noise. This problem is alleviated via the use of universal thief datasets like ImageNet. On an average, using the full thief dataset (100K) leads to an improvement in agreement by 4.82× over the uniform baseline. Even with a budget of 30K, an improvement of 4.70× is retained with active learning.
Influence of substitute model architecture
To check the influence of the architecture on the substitute model, we consider the following three options:
• Lower complexity (LC) architecture: This DNN architecture has two convolution blocks, with two repeated units each (consisting of two convolution layers, followed by a pooling layer). The convolution layers in each block have 32 and 64 filters, respectively.
• Base complexity (BC) architecture: This architecture has three convolution blocks, with three repeated units each (of the same configuration). The convolution layers in each block have 32, 64 and 128 filters, respectively. This is the architecture described in Section 5.2 and used in all the other experiments.
• Higher complexity (HC) architecture: This architecture has four convolution blocks, with two repeated units each (of the same configuration). The convolution layers in each block have 32, 64, 128 and 256 filters, respectively.
We consider all possible combinations of the above DNN architectures applied to both the secret and substitute models. The results of our experiments on the image classification tasks using all possible combinations of the above architectures as the secret and substitute model are tabulated in Table 5 . Since random is not run iteratively, it is indicated as a line parallel to the X-axis.
As is obvious from the table, the agreements along the principal diagonal, i.e. corresponding to scenarios where the secret model and substitute model architectures are identical, are in general high. These results also corroborate the findings of [38] . We believe that the performance degradation from using a less or more complex substitute model than the secret model results from underfitting or overfitting, respectively. A less complex model may not have the required complexity to fit to the constructed dataset as it is generated by querying a more complex function. Conversely, a more complex model may readily overfit to the constructed dataset, leading to poor generalization and thus a lower agreement score.
Even though the agreements are higher in general for identical complexities, they are still reasonably high even when there is mismatch in model complexities. Model reverse-engineering can be used to recover information the architecture and hyperparameters of the secret model. Using this information, the adversary can then construct a substitute model that has a similar architecture and a comparable set of hyperparameters, with the hope that the trained substitute model will achieve a better agreement.
Text classification
In addition to the image domain we also present the results of running our framework on datasets from the text domain.
For each text dataset (described in Section 5.1), we run our framework across the following total query budgets: 10K, 15K, 20K, 25K and 30K. As it is non-trivial to modify DeepFool to work on text, we omit the strategies that make use of it.
The results of our experiments on the text classification tasks are shown in Table 6 . Like for the image classification tasks, for a budget of 20K, we show the agreement at the end of each iteration for every strategy and each dataset in Figure 7 .
Effectiveness of active learning. As in the case of images, the use of intelligent selection of thief dataset samples peforms better: there is no dataset for which the random strategy performs better than all of the other strategies.
In particular, K-center and uncertainty underperform only once each. Furthermore, incremental improvement over iterations is evident in the case of text, as seen in Figure 7 .
Impact of the query budget. As in the case of images we observe a similar pattern in the text results where there is usually an improvement in agreement when increasing the total query budget.
Effectiveness of the universal thief. Once again, all 3 experiments using the thief dataset (random included) perform significantly better than the uniform noise baseline. On an average, using the full thief dataset (89K) leads to an In summary, our experiments on the text dataset illustrate that the framework is not restricted to image classification, but may be used with tangible benefits for other media types as well.
Related work
We discuss related work in three broad areas: model extraction, model reverse-engineering and active learning.
Model extraction
Attacks. Tramèr et al. [11] present the first work on model extraction, and the one that is closest to our setting of an adversary with a limited query budget. They introduce several methods for model extraction across different classes of models -starting with exact analytical solutions (where feasible) to gradient-based approximations (for shallow feedforward neural networks). However, as we demonstrated in Section 6.1, their approach of using random uniform noise as a thief dataset for DNNs fails for deeper networks.
Shi et al. [39] perform model extraction by train a deep learning substitute model to approximate the functionality of a traditional machine learning secret model. In particular, they demonstrate their approach on naïve Bayes and SVM secret models trained to perform text classification. They also show that the reverse is not true -models of lower complexity, viz., naïve Bayes or SVM are unable to learn approximations of more complex deep learning models.
Sethi and Kantardzic [40] present a Seed-Explore-Exploit framework whereby an adversary attempts to fool a security mechanism with a ML-based core, e.g., a CAPTCHA system that uses click time to determine whether the user is benign or a bot. They use model extraction to inform the generation of adversarial examples that allows the attacker to perturb inputs to bypass detection. To do this, they use the Seed-Explore-Exploit framework, which starts with a benign and malicious seed, and proceeds by using the Gram-Schmidt process to generate orthonormal samples near the mid-points of any two randomly selected seed points of opposite classes in the exploration phase. These are then used to train a substitute model, which provides useful information in the generation of adversarial examples (during the exploitation phase).
Chandrasekaran et al. [41] draw parallels between model extraction and active learning. They demonstrate that query synthesis (QS) active learning can be used to steal ML models such as decision trees by generating queries de novo, independent of the original dataset distribution. They implement two QS active learning algorithms and use them to extract binary classification models (d-dimensional halfspaces). In contrast to their approach, ours uses pool-based active learning.
Shi et al. [42] make use of active learning in conjunction with problem domain data to extract a shallow feedforward neural network for text applications, when interfacing with the secret model through APIs with strict rate limits. Shi et al. [43] design an exploratory attack that uses a generative adversarial network (GAN) trained on a small number of secret dataset samples, which is then able to generate informative samples to query the secret model with. In both these works, the extracted model is then used to launch evasion attacks (i.e. finding samples which the secret model incorrectly labels) and causative attacks (i.e. exploiting classifiers trained by user feedback by intentionally providing it mislabeled data).
Defenses. Quiring et al. [44] show that when the secret model is a decision tree, defenses against model watermarking can also be used as defenses for model extraction attacks. This defense is only applicable to decision trees, and does not apply to DNNs.
Lee et al. [45] apply a perturbation to the predicted softmax probability scores to dissuade model extraction adversaries. Of course, such a defense would still leave the secret model vulnerable to attacks that can work with only Top-1 predictions to be returned, such as ours. Of course, we speculate that it may lead to a lower agreement in our approach if the adversary does not identify the defense ahead of time and continues to operate on the perturbed softmax outputs directly.
Juuti et al. [38] design PRADA, a framework to detect model extraction attacks by computing the empirical distribution of pairwise distances between samples. They demonstrate that for natural samples (i.e. benign inputs to an MLaaS API), the distribution of pairwise distances is expected to fit a bell curve, whereas for noisy samples a peaky distribution is observed instead. The queries made by a client can be logged and the distribution can be analyzed to detect a potential model extraction attack. We speculate that our approach will break this defense, as the universal thief datasets that it pulls from -while not from the same domain -are indeed otherwise natural, and we expect pairwise distances between samples to fit a bell curve.
Hanzlik et al. [46] design MLCapsule, a guarded offline deployment of MLaaS using Intel SGX. This allows providers of machine learning services to serve offline models with the same security guarantees that are possible for a custom server-side deployment, while having the additional benefit that the user does not have to trust the service provider with their input data. They demonstrate an implementation of PRADA [38] within MLCapsule as a defense against model extraction attacks.
Xu et al. [47] obfuscate CNN models by replacing the complex CNN feature extractors with shallow, sequential convolution blocks. Networks with 10s or 100s of layers are simulated with a shallow network with 5-7 convolution layers. The obfuscated secret model is shown to be more resilient to both structure piracy (i.e. model reverseengineering) and parameter piracy, thus dissuading model extraction attackers. We speculate that our approach will still be able to extract the model if it is given access to the obfuscated model through the same API interface.
Kesarwani et al. [48] design a model extraction monitor that logs the queries made by users of a MLaaS service. They use two metrics -total information gain and coverage of the input feature space by the user's queries -in order to detect a possible model extraction attack, while minimizing computational overhead. They demonstrate their monitor for decision tree and neural network secret models. We speculate that our approach may be detected by such a model extraction monitor, however an informed adversary could choose to tweak the active learning subset selection strategy to avoid detection by picking samples with lower information gain, and covering only a limited portion of the feature space.
Applications. Papernot et al. [7] use model extraction for the generation of adversarial examples. They query a limited subset of the training data, or hand-crafted samples that resemble it, against the secret model. The resulting labels are then used to train a crude substitute model with a low test agreement. A white-box adversarial example generation technique is used to generate adversarial examples, which are then used to attack the original secret model by leveraging the transferability of adversarial examples.
Model reverse-engineering
As we show in Section 6.2, while the agreement obtained by us is respectable even when the secret model and substitute model architectures do not match, agreement is improved when they match. Thus, it is in the best interest of the adversary to try to obtain information about the secret model architecture -this is possible through model reverse-engineering.
Oh et al. [17] train a meta-model which takes as input the softmax prediction probabilities returned by the secret model and predicts, with statistically significant confidence, secret model hyperparameters such as the number of convolution layers, the filter size of CNNs, the activation function used, the amount of dropout, batch size, optimizer, etc. To do this, they first randomly generate and trains networks of varying complexity and queries them to create a dataset to train the meta-model on.
Wang and Gong [18] estimate the regularizer scale factor λ for linear regression (ridge regression and LASSO), kernel regression (kernel ridge regression), linear classification (SVM with hinge loss, SVM with squared hinge loss, L 1 -regularized logistic regression and L 2 -regularized logistic regression) and kernel classification algorithms (kernel SVM with hinge loss, kernel SVM with squared hinge loss).
Duddu et al. [19] use a timing side channel for model reverse-engineering, i.e. they use the execution time of the forward pass of the secret model, averaged across queries, to infer model architecture and hyperparameters. This information is then used to reduce the search space by querying a pretrained regressor trained to map execution time to hyperparameters (such as the number of layers). Further search is performed using a reinforcement learning algorithm that predicts the best model architecture and hyperparameters in this restricted search space.
Yan et al. [20] use a similar insight that the forward pass of DNNs rely on GeMM (generalized matrix multiply) library operations. They use information from cache side channels to reverse engineer information about DNN architectures, such as the number of layers (for a fully connected network) and number of filters (for a CNN). However, such an attack cannot determine the presence and configuration of parameter-free layers such as activation and pooling layers.
Hong et al. [22] present another attack using cache side channels that monitors the shared instruction cache. The attacker periodically flushes the cache lines used by the victim secret model and measures access time to the target instructions. This side channel information is then used to reconstruct the architecture, including parameter-free layers.
Hu et al. [21] use bus snooping techniques (passively monitoring PCIe and memory bus events). Using this information, they first infer kernel features such as read and write data volume of memory requests. This information is then used to reconstruct the layer topology and predict the network architecture.
Active learning
There is an existing body of work on active learning, applied traditionally to classic machine learning models such as naïve Bayes and SVMs. We refer the reader to the survey by Settles [16] for details.
Active learning methods engineered specifically for deep neural networks include the following:
• Sener and Savarese [24] present an active learning strategy based on core-set construction. The construction of core-sets for CNNs is approximated by solving a K-center problem. The solution is further made robust by solving a mixed integer program that ensures the number of outliers does not exceed a threshold. They demonstrate significant improvements, when training deep CNNs, over earlier active learning strategies (such as uncertainty) and over a K-median baseline.
• Ducoffe and Precioso [14] present a margin-based approach to active learning. The DeepFool [6] method for generation of adversarial examples is used to generate samples close to the decision boundary by perturbing an input image until the class predicted by the image classification model changes. They demonstrate that their method is competitive to that of [24] for image classification tasks on CNNs, while significantly outperforming classical methods (such as uncertainty).
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce three criteria for practical model extraction. Our primary contribution is a novel framework that makes careful use of unlabeled public data and active learning to satisfy these criteria.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework by successfully applying it to a diverse set of datasets. Our framework is able to extract DNNs with high test agreement and on a limited query budget, using only a fraction (10-30%) of the data available to it.
Future work on developing this method of attack includes the development of better active learning strategies and the exploration of other novel combinations of existing active learning strategies.
